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Abstract
Informally, ‘Information Inconsistency’ is the property that has been observed in many Bayesian
hypothesis testing and model selection procedures whereby the Bayesian conclusion does not be-
come definitive when the data seems to become definitive. An example is that, when performing
a t-test using standard conjugate priors, the Bayes factor of the alternative hypothesis to the
null hypothesis remains bounded as the t statistic grows to infinity. This paper shows that in-
formation inconsistency is ubiquitous in Bayesian hypothesis testing under conjugate priors. Yet
the title does not fully describe the paper, since we also show that theoretically recommended
priors, including scale mixtures of conjugate priors and adaptive priors, are information consis-
tent. Hence the paper is simply a forceful warning that use of conjugate priors in testing and
model selection is highly problematical, and should be replaced by the information consistent
alternatives.
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1 Introduction
When testing a precise null hypothesis H0 against an unrestricted alternative hypothesis H1, a com-
mon Bayesian tool is the Bayes factor, B10, which quantifies the relative evidence (or odds) from the
data for H1 against H0. A Bayes factor is called information inconsistent if, when the evidence for the
alternative hypothesis appears to be overwhelming (in the sense that the observed effect under the
alternative hypothesis becomes arbitrarily large), the Bayes factor converges to a constant B∗ < ∞.
This conflicting behavior is also referred to as the information paradox (Liang et al., 2008).
Example 1 A typical example of an information inconsistent Bayes factor is when using Zellner’s
(1986) g-prior for testing the regression coefficients in a linear regression model y = γ1n +Xθθ + ,
with  ∼ N(0, σ2In), where y is a vector containing the n responses, γ is the intercept, Xθ is a n× r1
matrix containing the explanatory variables, θ is a vector with the r1 unknown coefficients that are
tested, σ2 is the unknown error variance, 1n is a vector of length n with ones, and In is the identity
matrix of size n. When testing H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ 6= 0 with the g-prior, pi0(γ, σ2) ∝ σ−2 and
pi1(θ | γ, σ2) = Nθ|γ,σ2(0, gσ2(X′θXθ)−1) and pi1(γ, σ2) ∝ σ−2, for some fixed g > 0, the Bayes factor
goes to (1 + g)n−r1−1 < ∞ as the evidence against H0 accumulates in the sense that |θˆ| → ∞ (see
also, Berger & Pericchi, 2001). Furthermore, it has also been reported that the g-prior is information
inconsistent when testing one-sided hypotheses (Mulder, 2014a).
In comparison to large sample inconsistency, which occurs when the evidence for the true hy-
pothesis against another hypothesis does not go to infinity as the sample size grows, information
inconsistency has not received much attention in the literature. In our view, both types of inconsis-
tency are undesirable and should be avoided in general testing procedures. The goal of this paper is
therefore to explore information inconsistency in a more general setting. We will consider improper
as well as proper priors; conjugate priors, scale mixtures of conjugate priors, independent priors,
and adaptive priors; and precise null hypothesis testing, one-sided hypothesis testing, and multiple
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hypothesis testing. Throughout the paper we also consider variations of Zellner’s g prior (e.g., fixed
g priors, mixtures of g priors, and adaptive (data-based) g priors) as this class of priors is commonly
observed in the literature. One of the main questions we want to address is whether information
consistent Bayes factors can be obtained using ‘standard’ conjugate or independent semi-conjugate
priors, or whether more sophisticated scale mixtures or adaptive priors are needed. We also explore
whether there are any practical consequences by investigating when information inconsistency starts
to manifest itself and what the limiting value of the Bayes factor is.
The paper is organized as follows. First the linear regression model with dependent errors as well
as some notation are introduced (Section 2). Subsequently Section 3 explores information consistency
when testing a precise hypothesis using various prior specifications, followed by one-sided hypothesis
tests in Section 4, and a multiple hypothesis test in Section 5. We end the paper with some conclusions
and recommendations in Section 6.
2 The Linear Regression Model with Dependent Errors
Throughout this paper the focus shall be on the linear regression model with dependent errors,
y = Xββ + , with  ∼ N(0, σ2Σ), (1)
where the vector y of length n contains the responses, Xβ = [x1 . . . xK ] is an n×K matrix containing
the K predictor variables which are regressed on the K unknown regression coefficients in β (n > K),
 is a normally distributed error vector, σ2 is an unknown common variance, and Σ is a known
covariance matrix.
Three different types of hypothesis tests will be considered. First, we consider the classical null
hypothesis test of a set of linear restrictions on β against an unrestricted alternative, i.e., H0 : Rβ = 0
versusH1 : Rβ 6= 0, whereR is an r1×K matrix with known constants (r1 ≤ K). Second, we consider
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the equivalent one-sided hypothesis test of H0 : Rβ ≤ 0 versus H1 : Rβ 6≤ 0, where “ 6≤” implies that
at least one inequality goes the other direction. Third, we briefly consider the three hypothesis test
H0 : Rβ = 0 versus H1 : Rβ ≤ 0 (with Rβ = 0 excluded) versus H2 : Rβ 6≤ 0.
The model is reparametrized so that the linear combination of parameters of interest, i.e., θ = Rβ,
is perpendicular to the nuisance parameters, i.e., γ = Dβ, i.e.,
 θ
γ
 =
 R
D
β = Tβ,
where the r2 × K matrix D contains r2 = K − r1 independent rows of P⊥RX′βΣ−1Xβ, where the
orthogonal projection matrix is given by P⊥R = IK −R′ (RR′)−1 R. Subsequently, the model can be
written as
y = Xθθ + Xγγ + ,
where Xθ contain the first r1 columns of XT−1 that are regressed on θ and Xγ contains the remaining
r2 columns of XT−1 that are regressed on γ. The null hypothesis can then be written as H0 : θ = 0
versus H1 : θ ∈ Rr1 and the nonnested hypothesis test can be written as H0 : θ ≤ 0 versus H1 : θ 6≤ 0.
Further note that the ML estimates of θ and γ are independent because
(
[XT−1]′Σ−1[XT−1]
)−1
=
diag
(
(X′θΣ−1Xθ)
−1
,
(
X′γΣ−1Xγ
)−1) which is a direct consequence of the choice of D.
Throughout this paper, the free parameters under a hypothesis have a hypothesis index to make
it explicit that the parameters under different hypotheses have different interpretations and therefore
different priors. For example, the population variances under H0 and H1 are denoted by σ20 and σ21,
respectively.
3 Testing a Precise Hypothesis
The following definition will be used for information inconsistency when testing a precise hypothesis.
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Definition 1 A Bayes factor, B10, is called information inconsistent for testing H0 : θ = 0 versus
H1 : θ 6= 0 if there exists a sequence of possible data, with corresponding θˆi that satisfy |θˆi| → ∞ as
i→∞, for which the Bayes factors B10 < B∗10 <∞.
3.1 Conjugate priors
In the conjugate case, the conditional prior of θ | σ21 under H1 has a multivariate normal distribution
and the marginal prior of σ2t , for t = 0 or 1, has a scaled inverse chi-squared distribution, resulting in
pi1(θ,γ1, σ
2
1) = pi1(θ | σ21)× pi1(γ1)× pi1(σ21)
∝ Nθ|σ21(0, σ21Ω)× 1× inv-χ2σ21(s
2
1, ν1) (2)
pi0(γ0, σ
2
0) = pi0(γ0)× pi0(σ20)
∝ 1× inv-χ2σ20(s
2
0, ν0) . (3)
The scaled inverse chi-squared distribution is used (instead of the inverse gamma distribution) because
of the natural relation between the prior degrees of freedom νt and the sample size n (Gelman et al.,
2004). When setting the prior degrees of freedom equal to νt = 0, we obtain the objective improper
prior, pit(σ2t ) ∝ σ−2t , for t = 0 or 1, and when additionally setting Ω = g (X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1, we obtain
Zellner’s g-prior.
Denoting the ML estimate of θ by θˆ = (X′θΣ−1Xθ)
−1 X′θΣ−1y and the sums of squares by
s2y = (y−Xθθˆ −Xγγˆ)′Σ−1(y−Xθθˆ −Xγγˆ), a standard calculation yields that the Bayes factor of
H1 against H0, based on the conjugate priors in (2) and (3), is
B10 = C1 ×
(
s21ν1 + s
2
y + θˆ
′
(
(X′θΣ−1Xθ)
−1
+ Ω
)−1
θˆ
)−(n+ν1−r2)/2
(
s20ν0 + s
2
y + θˆ
′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−(n+ν0−r2)/2 , (4)
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where the constant is
C1 =
(ν1/2)
ν1/2sν11 Γ
(
ν0
2
)
Γ
(
n+ν1−r2
2
)
(ν0/2)ν0/2s
ν0
0 Γ
(
ν1
2
)
Γ
(
n+ν0−r2
2
)2(ν1−ν0)/2|Ω + (X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1|− 12 |X′θΣ−1Xθ|− 12 .
The following result is immediate.
Lemma 1 As |θˆ| → ∞, the Bayes factor in (4) satisfies B10 → 0 if ν0 < ν1; B10 → ∞ if ν0 > ν1;
and, if ν0 = ν1,
B10 ≤ C1
lim sup
|θˆ|→∞
θˆ′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
θˆ′
(
(X′θΣ−1Xθ)
−1
+ Ω
)−1
θˆ

(n+ν−r2)
2
= C1 (1 + λmax)
(n+ν−r2)/2 <∞ ,
where λmax is the largest eigenvalue of X′θΣ−1XθΩ.
Remark 1 Setting ν0 < ν1 seems logical because it implies that the prior for σ21 is more concentrated
than the prior for σ20 (consistent with a nonzero mean explaining some of the variation compared to a
zero mean). This choice however results in a disastrously information inconsistent Bayes factor, with
the conclusion being that the null hypothesis is certainly true when |θˆ| → ∞.
Remark 2 Setting ν0 = ν1 is the usual choice, which still results in an information inconsistent Bayes
factor. Note that the prior degrees of prior would be set to 0 in the objective Bayesian approach. The
impact of this inconsistency will be discussed below for the special case of the univariate t-test.
Remark 3 Setting ν0 > ν1 would not be a logical choice because the prior for σ20 is more concentrated
than the prior for σ21, even though the regression coefficients θ under H0 are restricted to 0. The
resulting Bayes factor, however, is information consistent. A special case of this choice arises from
setting the prior for the variance under H0 to be proportional to the conditional prior of the variance
given θ = 0 under H1, i.e., pi0(σ2) = pi1(σ2 | θ = 0) = inv-χ2( ν1ν1+r1 s21, ν1+r1), so that ν0 = ν1+r1. The
6
Bayes factor can then be expressed as the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Dickey, 1971), B10 = pi1(θ=0)pi1(θ=0|X) ,
where the marginal prior and the posterior of θ have a Student t-distribution.
3.1.1 Practical implications for a univariate test under dependence
The practical importance of information inconsistency is explored for the objective prior with ν1 =
ν0 = 0 for a univariate t-test of H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ 6= 0 with correlated data. Specifically,
consider r1 = 1, r2 = 0, Xθ = 1n, and Ω = 1, with Σ being the correlation matrix with identical
correlations ρ in the off-diagonal elements. The t-statistic, t = θˆ
√
1′nΣ−11n
sy/
√
n−1 , then has a t-distribution
with n− 1 degrees of freedom under H0. The Bayes factor in (4) can then be expressed as a function
of the t-statistic, namely
B10 =
(
1 +
n
1 + (n− 1)ρ
)−1/2(
1− nt
2
[t2 + n− 1][n+ 1 + (n− 1)ρ]
)−n/2
.
The limiting value of the Bayes factor, as |t| goes to infinity, is
lim
|t|→∞
B10 =
(
1 +
n
1 + (n− 1)ρ
)−1/2(
1− n
n+ 1 + (n− 1)ρ
)−n/2
=

(1 + n)(n−1)/2, if ρ = 0;(
1 + 2n
n+1
)−1/2 (3n+1
n+1
)n/2 ≈ 3(n−1)/2, if ρ = 0.5;
2(n−1)/2, if ρ = 1.
Hence, the correlation can dramatically affect the situation. Table 1 provides the limiting value of
the Bayes factor as |t| goes to ∞ for different choices of the correlation ρ and different sample sizes
varying from n = 2 to a sample size of n = 20. The table also provides the Bayes factor when
t = 4 to check whether inconsistency starts coming into play for a large t-value. As comparisons, the
corresponding two-sided p-values are also provided, as well as the upper bound B10 < 1/[−ep log p],
which is a bound over a large nonparametric class of priors (derived in Sellke et al. (2001)).
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Table 1: Limiting values of the Bayes factor for a univariate t-test as |t| → ∞ for different choices of
the sample size n and the correlation ρ. Additionally Bayes factors and two-sided p-values are given
when t = 4. The approximation 1/[−ep log p] is an upper bound of the evidence against H0 (Sellke
et al., 2001).
n 2 5 7 10 20
ρ = 0 limit 1.73 36 512 4.85× 104 1.79× 1011
B10 for t = 4 1.55 6.36 12.21 23.61 66.20
ρ = 0.5 limit 1.53 7.10 20.8 106 2.01× 104
B10 for t = 4 1.42 3.46 5.31 8.54 20.71
ρ ≈ 1 limit 1.41 4 8 22.6 724
B10 for t = 4 1.34 2.76 3.44 4.86 9.47
p-value for t = 4 0.156 0.016 0.0071 0.0031 0.00077
1/[−ep log p] 2.25 7.81 13.47 24.40 72.01
When there is zero correlation, the limit (n + 1)(n−1)/2 is large for sample sizes larger than 6, so
that information inconsistency is then not problematical practically. For large correlations on the
other hand, and especially when ρ is close to 1, the limiting values can be quite small, arguing against
the use of objective conjugate priors.
Figure 1 displays the Bayes factor as a function of log10(t) when using conjugate priors (solid lines)
and n = 7, ρ = .5, s2y = n− 1 = 6, s20 = s21 = 1, and different choices for the prior degrees of freedom,
namely (ν0, ν1) = (0, 0), (1, 2) or (2, 1). As can be seen, if ν0 = ν1 = 0, the logarithm of the Bayes
factor converges to log10(20.8) = 1.32 (Table 1); if ν0 > ν1. Furthermore, if ν0 < ν1 (or ν0 > ν1),
the evidence goes to ∞ for H0 (or H1) as t→∞ implying information inconsistency (or information
consistency).
3.2 Mixtures of conjugate priors
Although use of conjugate priors in testing is common, it has long been argued (starting with Jeffreys
(1961)) that fatter tailed prior distributions should be used. One such class that is increasingly
popular is the class of scale mixtures of conjugate priors. This class results in information consistent
Bayes factors if the prior on g is thick enough, as shown by the following lemmas which generalize
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Figure 1: The Bayes factor B10 based on the conjugate prior (solid line) and independence prior
(dashed line) as a function of t-values when n = 7, ρ = .5, s2y = n− 1 = 6, s20 = s21 = 1, and different
choices for the prior degrees of freedom ν0 and ν1.
the result in Liang et al. (2008) for ν0 = ν1 = 0, Σ = I, and Ω = g(X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1.
Lemma 2 Let θ | g,γ1, σ21 ∼ Nr1(0r1 , gσ21Ω), where σ21 has the prior specified in (3) and g has a
prior with density pi(g). If ν0 > ν1, any pi(g) with positive support yields an information-consistent
B10. The condition ∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−r1−r2+ν1)/2pi(g)dg =∞
is necessary and sufficient for information consistency whenever ν0 = ν1, and necessary whenever
ν0 < ν1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The maximum number of finite moments that the prior on g can have to achieve information
consistency increases with the sample size n and decreases with the number of predictors K = r1 +r2.
Lemma 2 gives us a complete description for all scale mixtures of conjugate priors whenever ν0 ≥ ν1,
but only gives us a necessary condition for information consistency for ν0 < ν1. The lemma below
characterizes the behavior of polynomial-tailed priors on g in this latter case, and provides partial
results for priors with thinner- and thicker-than-polynomial priors on g.
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Lemma 3 Suppose ν0 < ν1 and let θ | g,γ1, σ21 ∼ Nr1(0r1 , gσ21Ω), where σ21 has the prior specified in
(3) and g has a prior with density pi(g). Then, the following are true:
1. If there exist 0 < M < ∞ and 0 < K < ∞ such that for all g ≥ M , pi(g) ≥ Kg−α for α > 1,
B10 is information consistent whenever α < (n− r1 − r2 + ν0)/2 + 1.
2. If there exist 0 < M ′ <∞ and 0 < K ′ <∞ such that for all g ≥M ′, pi(g) ≤ K ′g−α for α > 1,
B10 is information inconsistent whenever α ≥ (n− r1 − r2 + ν0)/2 + 1.
[NB: All of the priors on g considered in Liang et al. (2008) satisfy both conditions.]
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that the Zellner-Siow prior (Zellner & Siow, 1980) (which was the first proposed information
consistent prior for this situation) and the Hyper-g prior (Liang et al., 2008) satisfy both conditions
because they have polynomial tails.
3.3 Independence priors
3.3.1 Semi-conjugate prior
A feature of the conjugate prior that is sometimes questioned is the dependence induced between θ
and σ2; in objective Bayesian analysis this is hard to avoid (only σ is available to provide an objective
scale for θ), but it does seem rather arbitrary. Hence it is of interest to also investigate information
consistency using semi-conjugate priors of the form
pi1(θ,γ1, σ
2
1) = pi1(θ)× pi1(γ1)× pi1(σ21)
∝ Nθ(0,Ω)× 1× inv-χ2σ21(s
2
1, ν1)
pi0(γ0, σ
2
0) = pi0(γ0)× pi0(σ20)
∝ 1× inv-χ2σ20(s
2
0, ν0).
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With these semi-conjugate priors, the Bayes factor becomes
B10 = C2 ×
∫ (
ν1s
2
1 + s
2
y + (θ − θˆ)′X′θΣ−1Xθ(θ − θˆ)
)−n−r2+ν1
2
Nθ(0,Ω)dθ(
ν0s20 + s
2
y + θˆ
′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν0
2
, (5)
where
C2 =
(ν1/2)
ν1/2sν11 Γ
(
ν0
2
)
Γ
(
n+ν1−r2
2
)
(ν0/2)ν0/2s
ν0
0 Γ
(
ν1
2
)
Γ
(
n+ν0−r2
2
)2(ν1−ν0)/2 .
Lemma 4 As |θˆ| → ∞, the Bayes factor in (5), based on the independent semi-conjugate prior,
behaves as follows:
B10 →

0 if ν0 < ν1;
1 if ν0 = ν1;
∞ if ν0 > ν1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that, in the typical case of ν0 = ν1, we observe an even worse case of information inconsistency
than for the conjugate prior because the relative evidence between H1 and H0 goes to 1 when there
appears to be overwhelming evidence for H1; in contrast, for the conjugate prior case, the limiting
Bayes factor – while nonzero – was at least exponentially small in n.
The intuition behind this result is that very large θˆ are equally unlikely under H1 and H0, due to
the light-tailed normal prior for θ under H1. Furthermore, the limits are the same as in the conjugate
case if ν0 6= ν1. Hence, the choice of the prior degrees of freedom plays a crucial role in information
inconsistency, even when the variance is apriori independent of θ.
Figure 1 also displays the Bayes factor, based on the independence prior, as a function of log10(t)
for the univariate t-test when the data correlation is ρ = .5 (dashed line). As can be seen the Bayes
factor based on the independence prior and the conjugate prior with the same hyper parameters are
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approximately equal for absolute t values smaller than approximately log10(.5). For larger t values,
the flatter tails of the independence priors start to have an effect resulting in a decrease of the Bayes
factor, relative to the Bayes factor based on the conjugate priors.
3.3.2 Fatter-tailed independence priors
It is somewhat unfair to use an independent normal prior for model comparison here since, from
Jeffreys (1961), the use of fatter tailed priors has been recommended. To keep the discussion of fatter
tailed priors simple, we consider only the one dimensional case (i.e., r2 = 0), and restrict the prior
pi1(θ) to be a t-distribution with mean 0, scale τ (fixed) and degrees of freedom ν, i.e.,
pi1(θ) =
Γ((ν + 1)/2)√
νpi Γ(ν/2)τ
(
1 +
θ2
ντ 2
)− ν+1
2
.
Then Theorem 3.3 in Fan & Berger (1992) shows that, as |θˆ| → ∞,
B10 = C
Γ((n∗+1)/2)√
n∗pi Γ(n∗/2)
√
V
(
1 + θˆ
2
n∗V
)−n∗+1
2
+ Γ((ν+1)/2)√
νpi Γ(ν/2)τ
(
1 + θˆ
2
ντ2
)− ν+1
2
(
ν0s20 + s
2
y + θˆ
′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n+ν0
2
× (1 + o(1)) ,
where n∗ = n+ ν1 − 1, V = (ν1s21 + s2y)/[n∗X′θΣ−1Xθ] and
C =
(ν1/2)
ν1/2sν11
√
n∗pi Γ(n∗/2)
√
V
Γ (ν1/2) (ν1s21 + s
2
y)
(n+ν1)/2
.
Thus, as |θˆ| → ∞,
B10 →

0 if n+ ν0 < min{n− 1 + ν1, ν + 1};
constant if n+ ν0 = min{n− 1 + ν1, ν + 1};
∞ if n+ ν0 > min{n− 1 + ν1, ν + 1}.
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Since n ≥ 2, if 0 < ν < 1 it will be true that n + ν0 > min{n − 1 + ν1, ν + 1} so that B10 will be
information consistent. For the commonly used Cauchy prior (ν = 1), information consistency also
holds, except for the case when n = 2 and ν0 = 0 (this last corresponding to the objective prior for
σ21). It is interesting that information consistency does hold for this last case when pi1(θ) is chosen to
be Cauchy(0, σ1) (cf. Liang et al., 2008) and ν1 = 0; thus, once again, insisting on prior independence
of σ21 and θ only appears to worsen the problem of information inconsistency.
3.4 Adaptive priors
Another approach to Bayesian hypothesis testing is to let the prior under H1 adapt to the likelihood,
as in George & Foster (2000) and Hansen & Yu (2001).
Example 2 For the g-prior in the t-test, when the t-statistic t =
√
θˆ′X′θΣ−1Xθ θˆ
s2y/(n−1) > 1, the marginal
likelihood under H1 is maximized (calculus) for the choice g = n−r2−r1r1(n−1) t
2 − 1. The Bayes factor for
this choice equals
B10 =
(
r1(n− 1)
t2(n− r1 − r2)
) r1
2
(
(n− 1 + t2)(n− r1 − r2)
(n− 1)(n− r2)
)n−r2
2
,
which is information consistent. For a univariate t test, with r1 = 1 and r2 = 0, the resulting Bayes
factor can be expressed as B10 = 1|t|
(
n−1+t2
n
)n
2 .
The following lemma generalizes the result in Liang et al. (2008) for ν0 = ν1 = 0, Σ = I, and
Ω = g(X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1.
Lemma 5 Let θ | g,γ1, σ21 ∼ Nr1(0r1 , gσ21Ω), where σ21 has the prior specified in (3). If g > 0 is set
by maximizing B10, information consistency holds.
Proof: See Appendix D.
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Lemma 5 establishes information consistency for all ν0 and ν1. This is in contrast with the results
in previous sections, where the behavior of B10 depends (sometimes rather strongly) on ν0 and ν1.
4 One-Sided Hypothesis Testing
The following definition will be used for information consistency for a one-sided testing problem.
Definition 2 A Bayes factor is information consistent, for a one-sided hypothesis test of H0 : θ ≤ 0
versus H1 : θ 6≤ 0, if B10 → ∞ as |θˆ| → ∞ with at least one coordinate of θˆ going to ∞, and
B10 → 0, as all coordinates of θˆ go to −∞. If this does not hold, the Bayes factor is called information
inconsistent.
We shall denote the subspaces under H0 and H1 as Θ0 = {θ | θ ≤ 0} and Θ1 = {θ | θ 6≤ 0},
respectively.
4.1 Conjugate prior
When testing nonnested hypotheses, it is common to formulate an encompassing prior pi on the joint
space Θ = Θ0 ∪Θ1 and specify truncations of this prior under H0 and H1 (e.g., Berger & Mortera,
1999; Klugkist & Hoijtink, 2007). As in the null hypothesis test, the encompassing conjugate prior is
centered on the boundary of the subspaces under investigation, i.e.,
pi(θ,γ, σ2) ∝ Nθ|σ2(0, σ2Ω)× inv-χ2σ2(s2, ν), (6)
with a flat improper prior for γ. The priors under the nonnested hypotheses Ht, for t = 0 or 1, can
then be expressed as
pit(θ | σ2) = pi(θ | σ2)IΘt(θ)/Ppi(θ ∈ Θt | σ2) , (7)
14
pit(σ
2) = pi(σ2), and pit(γ) = pi(γ), with the denominator in (7) being equal to the conditional prior
probability of Θt under the joint prior on Θ, i.e., Ppi(θ ∈ Θt | σ2) =
∫
Θt
Nθ|σ2(0, σ2Ω)dθ > 0.
The Bayes factor for the one-sided hypothesis test based on the conjugate priors can then be
expressed as
B10 =
(
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | σ2 = 1)−1 − 1
)−1 (
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)−1 − 1
)
. (8)
The derivation is similar to that in Mulder (2014a). The prior and posterior probabilities that the
constraints hold under the encompassing model can be computed as the proportion of draws satisfying
the constraints. Also note that the conditional prior probability of θ ≤ 0 is completely determined by
the prior covariance matrix Ω and is independent of σ2 (therefore we can set σ2 = 1 in (8)). This is a
direct result of centering the encompassing prior on the point of interest 0. For example, if Ω = Ir1 ,
then Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | σ2) = 2−r1 , ∀σ2 > 0. In the g-prior with Ω = gσ2(XθΣ−1Xθ)−1, the prior probability
is completely determined by the covariance structure of the predictors.
As can be concluded from (8), a Bayes factor for a one-sided hypothesis test is information con-
sistent if Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y) → 0 as |θˆ| → ∞ with at least one coordinate of θˆ going to ∞, and
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)→ 1 as all coordinates of θˆ go to −∞.
Lemma 6 Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y) is bounded away from 0 and 1 for all y. Hence B10 is information incon-
sistent.
If θˆ = cv and c→∞, then
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)→ Ppi(ξ ≤ 0 | y) ,
where ξ has a multivariate t distribution with mean
v∗ =
(X′θΣ−1Xθ + Ω−1)−1X
′
θΣ
−1Xθv
(n+ ν − r2)−1/2(v′((X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1 + Ω)−1v)1/2
,
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scale matrix (X′θΣ−1Xθ + Ω−1)−1, and n+ ν − r2 degrees of freedom.
Proof: See Appendix E.
4.1.1 Practical implications for a univariate one-sided test under dependence
We investigate the practical importance of information inconsistency for a univariate one-sided t-test
under dependence of H0 : θ ≤ 0 versus H1 : θ > 0, with ν = 0, r1 = 1, r2 = 0, Xθ = 1, Ω = 1, and
Σ = ρJn + (1− ρ)In, so that Ppi (θ ≤ 0 | σ2) = 12 . Based on Lemma 6, the Bayes factor is then given
by
B10 = Tn
(
−
√
n2
1 + (n− 1)ρ+ t−2(n− 1)(1 + n+ (n− 1)ρ)
)−1
− 1
→ Tn
(
−n(1 + (n− 1)ρ)− 12
)−1
− 1, (9)
as t→∞, where Tν(·) denotes the cdf of a univariate Student t distribution with ν degrees of freedom.
Note that as t→ −∞, B10 converges to the reciprocal of (9).
Table 2 provides the limiting values of the Bayes factors and Bayes factors in the case of a relatively
large t-value of 4 for different sample sizes and correlations. When comparing Table 2 with Table 1,
we can conclude that the practical importance of information inconsistency for one-sided hypothesis
testing is considerably less problematic in comparison to the null hypothesis test. Finally Figure 2
(solid line) displays the Bayes factor for the one-sided hypothesis test as a function of the t-value
based on n = 7, ρ = .5, s2y = n− 1 = 6, and setting the objective improper based on ν = 0.
4.2 Mixtures of conjugate priors
We provide the following necessary and sufficient condition for information consistency for a scale
mixture of conjugate normal priors in a one-sided hypothesis test.
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Table 2: Limiting values of the Bayes factor for a one-sided univariate t test as t → ∞ for different
choices of the sample size n and the correlation ρ. Additionally Bayes factors and one-sided p-values
are given when t = 4.
n 2 5 7 10 20
ρ = 0 limit 9.90 486 9.45× 103 1.26× 106 1.85× 1014
B10 for t = 4 8.62 78.9 199 510 2.40× 103
ρ = 0.5 limit 7.19 57.2 199 1.21× 103 4.02× 105
B10 for t = 4 6.50 25.5 44.7 81.5 238
ρ ≈ 1 limit 5.83 25.5 59.3 197 8.57× 104
B10 for t = 4 5.37 14.7 22.4 35.2 80.9
one-sided
p-value for t = 4 0.078 0.008 0.0036 0.0016 0.0038
−1 0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
lo
g
10
(B
10
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log10(t)
Figure 2: The Bayes factor B10 for the one-sided hypothesis test based on the conjugate prior (solid
line) and independence prior (dashed line) as a function of t-values when n = 7, ρ = .5, s2y = n−1 = 6,
and setting the objective prior to be improper via ν = 0.
Lemma 7 Let θ | g, σ2 ∼ Nr1(0r1 , gσ2Ω), where σ2 has the prior specified in (6) and g has a prior
with density pi(g), and let w = E(θ | g,y). Assume that if there exists i such that θ̂i → +∞, there
exists j such that wj > 0. Alternatively, assume that if θ̂i → −∞ for all i, then wi < 0 for all i. [For
instance, this condition is satisfied if θ is univariate or Ω ∝ (X ′θΣ−1Xθ)−1]. Then, the condition
∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−r1−r2+ν)/2pi(g)dg =∞
is necessary and sufficient for information consistency.
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Proof: See Appendix F.
4.3 Independence prior
The independence semi-conjugate encompassing prior is given by
pi(θ,γ, σ2) ∝ Nθ(0,Ω)× inv-χ2σ2(s2, ν). (10)
The truncated priors of θ under the nonnested hypotheses are as in (7), except that the normalizing
constant Ppi(θ ∈ Θt) is the marginal prior probability of Θt.
The Bayes factor for the one-sided hypothesis test based on the independence prior can again be
expressed as
B10 =
(
Ppi(θ ≤ 0)−1 − 1
)−1 (
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)−1 − 1
)
, (11)
but note that the posterior probability is no longer available in closed form.
Lemma 8 As |θˆ| → ∞ and at least one coordinate of θˆ goes to ∞, the Bayes factor of H1 : θ 6≤ 0
versus H0 : θ ≤ 0 based on the independence encompassing prior in (10) satisfies
B10 →
(
Ppi(θ ≤ 0)−1 − 1
)−1
.
Proof: See Appendix G.
Thus, as in null hypothesis testing, the independence prior results in a serious violation of infor-
mation consistency because the evidence in the data of H1 relative to H0 goes to 1 when the evidence
against H0 appears to be overwhelming. For completeness, the Bayes factor for the one-sided hy-
pothesis test is also displayed in Figure 2 (dashed line), illustrating the extreme form of information
inconsistency.
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4.4 Adaptive priors
An adaptive prior can be specified where the prior covariance matrix of θ is adapted to the likelihood
such that the Bayes factor is maximized for the hypothesis that is supported by the data (i.e.,
maximizeB01 if θˆ ≤ 0, and maximize B10 elsewhere). Here we show that an adaptive g prior results
in an information consistent Bayes factor.
Lemma 9 The Bayes factor based on the g-prior, with gmax = arg maxg{B01} if θˆ ≤ 0 and gmax =
arg maxg{B10} if θˆ 6≤ 0, is information consistent for one-sided hypothesis testing.
Proof: A proof is given in Appendix H.
As shown in the proof, the choice for g that maximizes the Bayes factor is obtained by letting
g go to ∞. This was also proposed by Mulder (2014a) as a nonadaptive solution. As a result of
letting the prior variances go to infinity, the posterior is not shrunk towards the prior mean, which
is sufficient to establish information consistency. Therefore the methods of Mulder (2014b) and Gu
et al. (2014) are also information consistent. A potential issue of letting g go to infinity is that the
marginal likelihoods under H0 and H1 go to 0 in the limit. However because the Bayes factor in
(10) converges in the limit, with posterior probabilities that are computed using flat priors and prior
probabilities that are based on the prior covariance structure, the outcome seems a reasonable default
quantification of the relative evidence for a one-sided test.
5 Multiple hypothesis testing
We consider the following definition of the (in)formation consistency in a multiple testing problem.
Definition 3 A Bayes factor is information consistent, for a multiple hypothesis test of H0 : θ = 0
versus H1 : θ ∈ Θ1 = {θ | θ ≤ 0 and θ 6= 0} versus H2 : θ ∈ Θ2 = {θ | θ 6≤ 0}, if B20, B21 →∞ as
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|θˆ| → ∞ with at least one coordinate of θˆ going to ∞, and B10, B12 →∞, as all coordinates of θˆ go
to −∞. If this does not hold, the Bayes factor is called information inconsistent.
As the conjugate and independent semi-conjugate priors resulted in information inconsistent Bayes
factors for the one-sided hypothesis test, this automatically implies that these priors result in infor-
mation inconsistency for the multiple hypothesis test. A specific case that is interesting to mention is
when setting ν0 > ν when using conjugate priors. This setting of the prior degrees of freedom results
in information consistency for the precise hypothesis test. As |θˆ| → ∞, and at least one coordinate
of θˆ goes to ∞, the Bayes factor B20 goes to ∞ (a consequence of Lemma 1), and the Bayes factor
B21 goes to B∗21 < ∞ (a consequence of Lemma 6). In the case of the simple univariate t-test, this
implies that, as t→∞, the support for a negative effect, H1 : θ < 0, relative to no effect, H0 : θ = 0,
will go to ∞. Thus, even though setting more prior degrees of freedom under the precise hypothesis
than under the alternative results in information consistent behavior for the precise test (Lemma
1), generalizing this prior specification to the multiple hypothesis test results in a dramatic form of
information inconsistency.
Finally note that Lemma 2 and 7 give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the mixing
distribution of the scale mixture of conjugate priors to be information consistent in the multiple
testing problem.
6 Conclusions
The first major conclusion is that information inconsistency is ubiquitous in hypothesis testing and
model selection, when conjugate priors are used. It happens in standard null hypothesis testing
and one-sided testing; it happens with proper and improper conjugate priors; and it happens with
independence conjugate priors almost always. The practical importance of the problem varies over
different situations; it will primarily be a practical problem when the sample is small relative to the
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number of free parameters and there is high correlation between the observations. But, even in other
cases, we consider information inconsistency to be highlighting a logical flaw that might have other
serious consequences and is, hence, something to be avoided.
The second major conclusion is that use of either fatter-tailed priors (including appropriate mix-
tures of g-priors) or adaptive priors typically result in information consistency. This is not as surprising
as the almost complete lack of information consistency for conjugate priors, in that previous particular
fatter-tailed priors (such as the Zellner-Siow prior) had been shown to be information consistent. Still,
the generality in which such priors can be shown to be information consistent is highly comforting.
It should be noted that, when proper priors yield information inconsistency, a logical flaw in
Bayesian analysis is not being discovered; if one truly believed the priors were correct, then one
should behave in an information inconsistent manner. But one rarely accurately knows features of
the priors – such as their tail behaviors – that determine information inconsistency. Thus the intuitive
appeal of information consistency can be used as a significant aid to selection of such prior features.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Denote:
θ̂ =
(
X′θΣ
−1Xθ
)−1 X′θΣ−1y
s2y = (y−Xθθ̂ −Xγγ̂)′Σ−1(y−Xθθ̂ −Xγγ̂)
SSE0 = s
2
0ν0 + s
2
y
SSE1 = s
2
1ν1 + s
2
y
SSR = θ̂′X′θΣ
−1Xθθ̂
Iθ = X′θΣ−1Xθ
p0 = r2 − ν0
p1 = r2 − ν1
Throughout, we use the following notation for functions a, b:
• a(g, θ̂) . b(g, θ̂) if and only if there exists 0 < M < ∞ which doesn’t depend on g or θ̂ such
that a(g, θ̂) ≤Mb(g, θ̂).
• a(g, θ̂) & b(g, θ̂) if and only if there exists 0 < M < ∞ which doesn’t depend on g or θ̂ such
that a(g, θ̂) ≥Mb(g, θ̂).
• a(g, θ̂)  b(g, θ̂) if and only if a(g, θ̂) . b(g, θ̂) and a(g, θ̂) & b(g, θ̂).
Before we prove Lemma 2, we prove an auxiliary result
Lemma 10 Let
h(g) = |gΩ + I−1θ |−1/2[SSE1 + θ̂′(gΩ + I−1θ )−1θ̂]−(n−p1)/2,
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then, there exist 0 < dl < du <∞ such that
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
. h(g) . (g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
Proof: Consider the matrix factorization
I−1θ + gΩ = Ω1/2[Ω−1/2I−1θ Ω−1/2 + gIr1 ]Ω1/2,
and take the eigendecomposition Ω−1/2I−1θ Ω−1/2 = ODO′, where O is orthogonal and D diagonal
with elements 0 < dl < di < du <∞. Then, we can rewrite
I−1θ + gΩ = Ω1/2O[D + gIr1 ]O′Ω1/2.
We can bound
θ̂′Ω−1θ̂/(du + g) ≤ θ̂′(gΩ + I−1θ )−1θ̂ ≤ θ̂′Ω−1θ̂/(dl + g)
and
|gΩ + I−1θ |−1/2 ∝ |D + gIr1 |−1/2 ∈ [(g + du)−r1/2, (g + dl)−r1/2],
so
h(g) . (du + g)
(n−p1)/2(dl + g)−r1/2
[(du + g)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
. (du + g)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(du + g)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
.
Similarly, we can find the lower bound
h(g) & (g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
.
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Now, we prove Lemma 2 arguing by cases.
Case ν0 > ν1 Applying the lower bound in Lemma 10,
B10 &
[SSE0 + SSR]
(n−p0)/2
(θ̂′Ω−1θ̂)(n−p1)/2
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + dl)
SSE1
θ̂′Ω−1θ̂
+ 1](n−p1)/2
pi(dg).
Since p0 < p1, the term outside the integral goes to infinity as ‖θ̂‖2 →∞, and by Fatou’s lemma,
lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + dl)
SSE1
θ̂′Ω−1θ̂
+ 1](n−p1)/2
pi(dg) ≥
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2pi(dg),
which is clearly bounded away from 0 for any prior on g with positive support, so any such prior
yields an information-consistent B10 whenever ν0 > ν1.
Case ν0 = ν1 Applying the lower bound in Lemma 10 and Fatou’s lemma as we did for the case
ν0 > ν1:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
B10 &
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2pi(dg) lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[SSE0 + SSR]
(n−p0)/2
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
.
The limit is O(1), so a sufficient condition for information consistency is
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2pi(dg) 
∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−p1−r1)/2pi(dg) =∞,
as required.
Case ν0 < ν1 In this case, we apply the upper bound in Lemma 10:
B10 .
[SSE0 + SSR]
(n−p0)/2
(θ̂′Ω−1θ̂)(n−p1)/2
∫ ∞
0
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + du)
SSE1
θ̂′Ω−1θ̂
+ 1](n−p1)/2
pi(dg).
The term outside the integral goes to 0, so a necessary condition for information consistency is that
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the integral be infinite. We can bound the integral:
∫ ∞
0
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + du)
SSE1
θ̂′Ω−1θ̂
+ 1](n−p1)/2
pi(dg) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2 pi(dg),
so a necessary condition for information consistency is
∫ ∞
0
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2 pi(dg) 
∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−p1−r1)/2pi(dg) =∞,
as required.
B Proof of Lemma 3
Throughout, we use the notation in Appendix A.
Case 1. Suppose there exists M < ∞ such that for all g ≥ M , pi(g) & g−α for α > 1 and p0 > p1.
Then, we apply the lower bound in Lemma 10:
B10 & [SSE0 + SSR](n−p0)/2
∫ ∞
M
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg.
Now, note that for any K, d > 0 with 1− d < K,
0 ≤ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ K
min(0,1−d)
(g + d)(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + d)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p1)/2 = 0,
so
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
M
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
1−dl
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg.
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Plugging in:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
B10 & lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[SSE0 + SSR]
(n−p0)/2
∫ ∞
1−dl
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg
∝ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
SSE
(n−p1)/2
1
2F1
(
n− p1
2
,
r1
2
+ α− 1; r1
2
+ α;
−θ̂′Ω−1θ̂
SSE1
)
.
Using the identity
2F1(a, b; c; z) = (1− z)−b2F1
(
b, c− a; c; z
z−1
)
,
we have
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
B10 & lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
2F1
(
r1
2
+ α− 1, r1−(n−p1)
2
+ α; r1
2
+ α;R2
)
SSE
(n−p1)/2
1
[
1 + θ̂
′Ω−1θ̂
SSE1
](r1/2)+α−1 ,
where R2 = θ̂′Ω−1θ̂/(θ̂′Ω−1θ̂+SSE1)→ 1 as ‖θ̂‖2 →∞. If α < (n−p1−r1)/2+1 (which is satisfied
because α < (n − p0 − r1)/2 and p0 > p1 by assumption), the limit of the hypergeometric function
as R2 → 1 is a constant (by Gauss’ theorem). From here, it is immediate to conclude that B10 is
information consistent whenever the lower bound is infinite, which occurs for α < (n− p0− r1)/2 + 1,
as required.
Case 2. Suppose there exists M ′ < ∞ such that for all g ≥ M ′, pi(g) . g−α for α > 1 and p0 > p1.
Then, by Lemma 10:
B10 . [SSE0 + SSR](n−p0)/2
∫ ∞
M
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + du)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg.
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As argued in Case 1,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
M
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + du)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
1−du
(g + du)
(n−p1−r1)/2−α
[(g + du)SSE1 + θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
dg,
and carrying out the same computations as in Case 1:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
B10 . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
2F1
(
r1
2
+ α− 1, r1−(n−p1)
2
+ α; r1
2
+ α;R2
)
SSE
(n−p1)/2
1
[
1 + θ̂
′Ω−1θ̂
SSE1
](r1/2)+α−1 .
If (n − p0 − r1)/2 + 1 ≤ α < (n − p1 − r1)/2 + 1, the limit of the hypergeometric function is O(1)
and B10 is information inconsistent. If α ≥ (n− p1 − r1)/2 + 1, the necessary condition of Lemma 2
implies that B10 is information inconsistent. Therefore, B10 is information inconsistent whenever
α ≥ (n− p0 − r1)/2 + 1, as required.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Break the integral in B10 into the two regions R1 = {θ : |θ|2 ≤ |θˆ|} and R2 = {θ : |θ|2 > |θˆ|}. It is
easy to see that, for any fixed  > 0, there is a K such that, for |θˆ| > K and θ ∈ R1,
(1− )
(
θˆ′X′θΣ
−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
<
(
ν1s
2
1 + s
2
y + (θ − θˆ)′X′θΣ−1Xθ(θ − θˆ)
)−n−r2+ν1
2
< (1 + )
(
θˆ′X′θΣ
−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
.
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Thus, letting P (R1) denote the probability of R1 under the Nθ(0,Ω) density, it follows that, for
|θˆ| > K,
(1− )
(
θˆ′X′θΣ
−1P (Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
P (R1)
<
∫
R1
(
ν1s
2
1 + s
2
y + (θ − θˆ)′X′θΣ−1Xθ(θ − θˆ)
)−n−r2+ν1
2
Nθ(0,Ω)dθ
< (1 + )
(
θˆ′X′θΣ
−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
P (R1) .
As |θˆ| → ∞, the integral over R2 is clearly going to zero exponentially fast, while P (R1)→ 1. Since
 can be chosen arbitrarily small, it follows that, as |θˆ| → ∞,
∫ (
ν1s
2
1 + s
2
y + (θ − θˆ)′X′θΣ−1Xθ(θ − θˆ)
)−n−r2+ν1
2
Nθ(0,Ω)dθ(
θˆ′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
→ 1 .
Thus, as |θˆ| → ∞,
B10 → lim
|θˆ|→∞
C2
(
θˆ′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν1
2
(
ν0s20 + s
2
y + θˆ
′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν0
2
,
from which the results stated in the lemma follow directly.
D Proof of Lemma 5
Using the notation in Appendix A and applying Lemma 10:
B10 &
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]n−p1/2
(g + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(g + dl)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p1)/2
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For g > 0, the right-hand side is maximized at ĝ = max(0, (n− p1 − r1)θ̂′Ω−1θ̂/(r1SSE)− dl). Then,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
max
g≥0
B10 &
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p1)/2
(ĝ + dl)
(n−p1−r1)/2
[(ĝ + dl)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p1)/2
∝ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
(SSE0 + SSR)
(n−p0)/2
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]r1/2SSE(n−p1−r1)/2
=∞,
so the adaptive prior is information consistent.
E Proof of Lemma 6
The marginal posterior of θ in the joint space has a multivariate Student t distribution with mean
(X′θΣ−1Xθ+Ω−1)−1X
′
θΣ
−1Xθθˆ, scale matrix (n+ν−r2)−1(s2ν+s2y+θˆ′((X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1+Ω)−1θˆ)(X′θΣ−1Xθ+
Ω−1)−1, and n+ ν − r2 degrees of freedom. Change variables to
ξ = (n+ ν − r2)1/2(s2ν + s2y + θˆ′((X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1 + Ω)−1θˆ)−1/2θ ,
which has a multivariate Student t distribution with mean
ξ∗ =
(X′θΣ−1Xθ + Ω−1)−1X
′
θΣ
−1Xθθˆ
(n+ ν − r2)−1/2(s2ν + s2y + θˆ′((X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1 + Ω)−1θˆ)1/2
,
scale matrix (X′θΣ−1Xθ + Ω−1)−1, and n+ ν − r2 degrees of freedom. Note that
Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y) = Ppi(ξ ≤ 0 | y) .
It is easy to see that ξ∗ lies in a fixed compact set C for any θˆ, from which it is immediate that
Ppi(ξ ≤ 0 | y) is bounded away from 0 and 1.
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The second part of the lemma follows immediately from letting c→∞ in the expression for ξ∗.
F Proof of Lemma 7
Throughout, we use the notation in Appendix A.
Sufficient condition:
We start with the case where there exists θ̂i → +∞; we treat the case where all θ̂i → −∞ later.
We can write:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)p(g | y)dg
= lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
1
p(y)
∫ ∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)p(y | g)pi(dg)
∝ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
1
p(y)
∫ ∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)h(g) pi(dg),
with h as defined in Lemma 10 (but noting that, in this case, the notation is ν1 = ν). Letting
p = ν − r2 and using the upper bound in Lemma 10,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
∫ ∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y) (g + du)(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg)
From Lemma 6, we know that
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y) = P (ξ ≤ 0 | g,y),
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where ξ has a multivariate Student-t distribution, with location and scale
w = (Iθ + Ω−1/g)−1Iθθ̂
m =
(n+ ν − r2)1/2w
[SSE1 + θ̂′(I−1θ + gΩ)−1θ̂]1/2
S = (Iθ + Ω−1/g)−1.
We factor
S = Ω1/2(Ω1/2IθΩ1/2 + Ir1/g)−1Ω1/2 = Ω1/2O′(D−1 + Ir1/g)−1OΩ1/2,
where O is orthogonal and D is diagonal (with positive entries) as defined in Lemma 10. Therefore,
for a fixed coordinate j,
Sjj ∈
[
g
g/dl + 1
Ωjj,
g
g/du + 1
Ωjj
]
,
so 0 < Sjj < ∞ for g > 0. Using the same factorizations, we obtain ‖w‖2 ∝ θ̂′ΩΩθ̂ for g > 0.
Plugging this in and factorizing the denominator in m in a similar manner, we obtain
m =
(n+ ν − r2)1/2 ‖w‖
[SSE1 + θ̂′(I−1θ + gΩ)−1θ̂]1/2
w
‖w‖
∝ (θ̂
′ΩΩθ̂)1/2
[SSE1 + θ̂′(I−1θ + gΩ)−1θ̂]1/2
w
‖w‖ .
If we choose a coordinate j such that wj > 0 (which exists by assumption), using the lower bound in
Lemma 10,
mj &
(g + dl)
1/2(θ̂′ΩΩθ̂)1/2[
(g + dl)SSE1 + θ̂Ω−1θ̂
]1/2 & (g + dl)1/2[
(g + dl)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1
]1/2
31
Now,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
∫ ∞
0
P (Tn−p ≥mj/
√
Sjj) (g + du)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg)
where Tn−p is a central Student-t with n− p degrees of freedom. Let ε > 0, then
∫ ε
0
P (Tn−p ≥mj/
√
Sjj) (g + du)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg) ≤ (ε+ du)(n−p−r1)/2,
so
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
∫ ∞
ε
P (Tn−p ≥mj/
√
Sjj) (g + du)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg).
Therefore, we can plug in our bounds for mj and Sjj, which are bounded away from 0 whenever
g > 0. Using the tail bound
P (Tn−p ≥ x) . 1
x(1 + x2/ν)(n−p−1)/2
. x−(n−p)
and our previous work, we obtain
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) . lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
∫ ∞
ε
(g + du)
−r1/2 pi(dg)
∝ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
.
Clearly
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
= 0⇔ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2 p(y) =∞
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and
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2 p(y) = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2
∫ ∞
0
p(y | g) pi(dg)
∝ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2
∫ ∞
0
h(g) pi(dg)
& lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + dl)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg)
&
∫ ∞
0
lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
(g + dl)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + dl)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg)
=
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p−r1)/2pi(dg)

∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−p−r1)/2pi(dg).
Therefore, if the integral above is infinite, lim‖θ̂‖2→∞ P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = 0, as required.
Now we turn to the case where θ̂i → −∞ for all i, in which case we assume that wi < 0 for all i.
Then, a Fréchet bound ensures that
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = P (θ1 ≤ 0, θ2 ≤ 0, ... , θr1 ≤ 0 | y) ≥
r1∑
i=1
P (θi ≤ 0 | y)− (r1 − 1).
Therefore,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θi ≥ 0 | y) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ r1 ⇒ lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = 1.
Then, we can work with the conditional probabilities exactly as we did for the previous case:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θi ≥ 0 | y) = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫ ∞
0
P (θi ≥ 0 | g,y)p(g | y) dg
. lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
p(y)
∫ ∞
ε
P (Tn−p ≥ −mj/
√
Sjj) (g + du)
(n−p−r1)/2
[(g + du)SSE1/θ̂′Ω−1θ̂ + 1](n−p)/2
pi(dg).
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Since −mj is positive, the subsequent steps in the proof for the previous case allow us to conclude
that lim‖θ̂‖2→∞ P (θi ≥ 0 | y) = 0, as required.
Necessary condition:
In the sequel we assume that there is at least one i such that θ̂i → +∞. The case where all
coordinates go to −∞ can be dealt with the same way we did for the sufficient condition. We can
write:
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2
∫∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)p(y | g)pi(dg)
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2p(y)
.
First, we show that the limit of the numerator is bounded away from 0. Applying Fatou’s lemma and
one of the bounds in Lemma 10,
lim
‖θ̂‖2→∞
∫∞
0
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)p(y | g)pi(dg)
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂]−(n−p)/2
≥
∫ ∞
0
lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)h(g)
[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2
pi(dg)
&
∫ ∞
0
(g + dl)
(n−p−r1)/2 lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y)pi(dg),
and for any g,
lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (θ ≤ 0 | g,y) = lim inf
‖θ̂‖2→∞
P (ξ ≤ 0 | g,y)
where ξ is a multivariate Student-t as in Lemma 6. Lemma 6 shows that P (ξ ≤ 0 | g,y) is bounded
away from 0, which implies that the numerator is bounded away from 0, as claimed. A necessary
condition for lim‖θ̂‖2→∞ P (θ ≤ 0 | y) = 0 is that lim‖θ̂‖2→∞[θ̂′Ω−1θ̂](n−p)/2p(y) =∞ which, as we saw
in the proof of the sufficient condition, is equivalent to
∫ ∞
0
(g + 1)(n−p−r1)/2pi(dg) =∞,
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as required.
G Proof of Lemma 8
The second part of the Bayes factor in (11) can be expressed as (Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)−1 − 1) = k(Θ1)k(Θ0) , where
k(Θt) =
∫
θ∈Θt
(
νs2 + s2y +
(
θ − θˆ
)′
X′θΣ
−1Xθ
(
θ − θˆ
))−n−r2+ν2
Nθ(0,Ω,Θt)dθ,
and Nθ(0,Ω,Θt) denotes a truncated multivariate normal density for θ with mean 0 and covariance
matrix Ω, truncated in the subspace Θt for t = 0 or 1. Exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4
it can be shown that k(Θt) =
(
νs2 + s2y + θˆ
′X′θΣ−1Xθθˆ
)−n−r2+ν
2
(1 + o(1)) in the limit, so that
(Ppi(θ ≤ 0 | y)−1 − 1)→ 1.
H Proof of Lemma 9
The marginal posterior of θ in the joint space has a multivariate Student t distribution with mean
g
g+1
θˆ, scale matrix (n− r2)−1(s2y + (g + 1)−1θˆ′(X′θΣ−1Xθ)θˆ) gg+1(X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1, and n− r2 degrees of
freedom. A change of variables to ξ = g+1
g
, results in a multivariate Student t distribution with mean
θˆ, scale matrix (n − r2)−1((1 + g−1)s2y + g−1θˆ′(X′θΣ−1Xθ)θˆ)(X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1, and degrees of freedom
n− r2. Note that the posterior probability is invariant under this transformation, i.e., Ppi(θ ≤ 0|y) =
Ppi(ξ ≤ 0|y). Furthermore it important to note that the factor (1 + g−1)s2y + g−1θˆ′(X′θΣ−1Xθ)θˆ in
the scale matrix of ξ is a monotonically decreasing function of g. Now it is easy to see that if θˆ ≤ 0,
Ppi(ξ ≤ 0|y) monotonically increases as the scales decrease, and if θˆ 6≤ 0, Ppi(ξ ≤ 0|y) monotonically
decreases as the scales decrease. Thus, in order to maximize B01 if θˆ ≤ 0, and maximize B10 if θˆ 6≤ 0,
we have to let g go to ∞. For completeness note that the marginal posterior of θ in the joint space
with a multivariate Student t distribution with mean θˆ, scale matrix (n− r2)−1s2y(X′θΣ−1Xθ)−1, and
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n − r2 degrees of freedom, in the limit as g → ∞. Thus, even though a (data based) adaptive prior
is considered, the choice of g that maximizes the Bayes factor does not depend on the data. Note
that taking the limit g →∞ was already considered by Mulder (2014a) but not in the context of an
adaptive prior.
References
Berger, J. O., & Mortera, J. (1999). Default Bayes factors for nonnested hypothesis testing. Journal
of American Statistical Association, 94 , 542–554.
Berger, J. O., & Pericchi, L. (2001). Objective Bayesian methods for model selection: Introduction
and comparison (with discussion). In P. Lahiri (Ed.), Model selection (Institute of Mathematical
Statistics Lecture Notes ed., Vol. 38, pp. 135–207). Beachwood Ohio.
Dickey, J. (1971). The weighted likelihood ratio, linear hypotheses on normal location parameters.
The Annals of Statistics , 42 , 204–223.
Fan, T., & Berger, J. O. (1992). Behaviour of the posterior distribution and inferences for a normal
mean with t prior distributions. Statistics & Decisions , 10 , 99–120.
Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., & Rubin, D. B. (2004). Bayesian data analysis (Second ed.).
London: Chapman & Hall.
George, E., & Foster, D. P. (2000). Calibration and empirical bayes variable selection. Biometrika,
87 (4), 731–747.
Gu, X., Mulder, J., Decovic, M., & Hoijtink, H. (2014). Bayesian evaluation of inequality constrained
hypotheses. Psychological Methods , 19 .
36
Hansen, M. H., & Yu, B. (2001). Model selection and the principle of minimum description length.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 96 (454), 746–774.
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability-3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Klugkist, I., & Hoijtink, H. (2007). The Bayes factor for inequality and about equality constrained
models. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis , 51 , 6367–6379.
Liang, F., Paulo, R., Molina, G., Clyde, M. A., & Berger, J. O. (2008). Mixtures of g priors for
Bayesian variable selection. Journal of American Statistical Association, 103 (481), 410–423.
Mulder, J. (2014a). Bayes factors for testing inequality constrained hypotheses: Issues with prior
specification. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology , 67 , 153-171.
Mulder, J. (2014b). Prior adjusted default Bayes factors for testing (in)equality constrained hypothe-
ses. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis , 71 , 448–463.
Sellke, T., Bayarri, M. J., & Berger, J. O. (2001). Calibration of p-values for testing precise null
hypotheses. The American Statistician, 55 , 62–71.
Zellner, A., & Siow, A. (1980). Posterior odds ratios for selected regression hypotheses. In
J. M. Bernardo, M. H. DeGroot, D. V. Lindley, & A. F. M. Smith (Eds.), Bayesian statistics:
Proceedings of the first international meeting held in Valencia (Spain) (pp. 585–603). Valencia:
University Press.
37
